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WHY THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
CANNOT PROTECT AGAINST
HEALTH CARE DATA BREACHES
KRISTEN HEALD*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 2015, millions of Anthem health insurance customers were
notified that their personal information might have been accessed in a massive
data hack on the nation’s second-largest health insurer.1 The hackers might have
obtained the names, birthdays, social security numbers, street addresses, and employment information of as many as eighty million customers.2 A little over a
month later, the health insurance company Premera Blue Cross announced a data
breach that exposed the medical and financial data of as many as eleven million
customers.3
In the first half of 2015 alone, the healthcare sector suffered 187 data
breaches that compromised the medical records of eighty-four million patients,
and accounted for 21.1% of all breaches worldwide.4 This wave of high-profile
cyber attacks on healthcare organizations marks the beginning of data security
breaches, as hackers continue to set their sights on the healthcare industry.5
Health organizations are an ideal target for hackers looking for large amounts of
valuable information.6 On the black market, credit card information can sell for
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2. Chad Terhune, Anthem Hack Exposes Data on 80 Million; Experts Warn of Identity Theft, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-anthem-hacked-20150204-story.html.
3. Kate Vinton, Premera Blue Cross Breach May Have Exposed 11 Million Customers’ Medical
and Financial Data, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/03/17/11million-customers-medical-and-financial-data-may-have-been-exposed-in-premera-blue-cross-breach/.
4. Jack McCarthy, Healthcare Leads All Industries in Data Breaches, GOV’T HEALTH IT (Sep. 17,
2015), http://www.govhealthit.com/news/healthcare-leads-all-industries-data-breaches.
5. Andrea Peterson, 2015 is Already the Year of the Health-care Hack – And It’s Only Going to Get
Worse,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
20,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2015/03/20/2015-is-already-the-year-of-the-health-care-hack-and-its-only-going-to-getworse/.
6. Id.
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as little as one to two dollars per account whereas medical data can fetch around
fifty dollars per record.7 Credit cards can be quickly cancelled if stolen, but medical identity theft is extremely hard to fix, difficult to detect, and much more
damaging.8
Federal legislation like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”) created federal standards for the handling and use
of protected health information (“PHI”) and provided incentives for the accelerated adoption of electronic health records (“EHRs”) for patients to help doctors
share patient data.9 Although these federal compliance programs were meant to
improve healthcare security, the rush to adopt EHR systems in accordance with
the federal guidelines has not been coupled with adequate security measures,
leaving medical data vulnerable to data breaches.10 There is no federal law that
mandates specific security procedures that industries must follow, and health
care organizations have been more focused on delivering health care rather than
operational security.11
Health care data risks and potential data and monetary losses will force entities to reassess their insurance policies and coverage for data breaches. The
ambiguity of traditional coverage directed policyholders to look toward cyber
security insurance, a newly emerging market tailored specifically to cyber
risks.12 Because cyberattacks can be unpredictable and costs of data breaches can
be difficult to surmount, cyber security insurance can be expensive.13 Data
breaches have not only prompted insurers to increase premiums, but to also raise
deductibles and limit coverage for some companies.14
This Comment proposes a solution to this crisis, specifically that the federal
government should establish a transitional reinsurance program to cover the risks
taken by cyber insurance companies to encourage insurers to compete in the new
market and result in more affordable premiums. In addition to a risk-shifting
7. Rodika Tollefson, Healthcare Data at Risk: Why Medical Records Are Easy to Hack, Lucrative
to Sell, THIRDCERTAINTY (Jan. 5, 2015), http://thirdcertainty.com/news-analysis/part-1-healthcare-datarisk-medical-records-easy-hack-lucrative-sell/.
8. Id.
9. Cindy Gallee, The Importance of Data Encryption and Security Rules: Breaches of Electronic
Protected Health Information Under HIPAA and HITECH, 26 J. DUPAGE CTY. BAR ASS’N 16, 17 (2014).
10. Jessica Meyers, Hackers Threaten Health Care Industry’s Patient Records, BOSTON GLOBE
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/09/05/health-care-industry-ill-preparedfor-vicious-cyberthreats/ZdvDGaipJi7VSN0TogezkL/story.html.
11. Id.
12. Daniel Garrie & Michael Mann, Cyber-Security Insurance: Navigating the Landscape of a Growing Field, 31 J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 379, 379 (2014).
13. Id. at 384.
14. Jeff Goldman, Cyber Insurance Premiums Surge in Response to High-Profile Data Breaches,
ESECURITY PLANET (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/cyber-insurancepremiums-surge-in-response-to-high-profile-data-breaches.html.
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framework, the government should also act as a risk reducer by providing incentives to promote positive behavior that reduces the overall risk posed by data
breaches. Part II will explore the financial burden of data breaches on health care
organizations. Part III will assess the current state of insurance coverage for data
breaches as distinguished between commercial general liability insurance and
cyber insurance. Part IV will discuss why the current framework for protection
against data breaches is failing. Finally, Part V will propose legislative solutions
aimed at solving this problem.
II. FINANCIAL BURDEN OF DATA BREACHES
A. Federal Regulatory Framework
Overtime, federal legislation has adapted to change the scope and probability of health care risks and the potential liability faced by HIPAA compliant entities.15 Enforcement for HIPAA breach violations may result in massive penalty
payments and drastic increases to the expenses born by the violating organizations.16
On August 21, 1996, Congress passed the HIPAA to instigate widespread
reform within the health care industry.17 Two significant goals of HIPAA aimed
at curbing the costs of the health insurance industry by reducing health care fraud
and creating administrative simplification provisions to encourage the electronic
transmission of health information.18 Recognizing the need to protect patients’
medical data in light of electronic advances in health information, Congress included provisions within HIPAA that required the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to adopt national standards concerning the privacy and
security of protected health information PHI.19 In 2000, HHS published a Privacy
Rule that set national standards for the protection of the confidentiality of health
information and focused on the individual’s right to control the use of his or her
information.20 The rule applied to three types of entities: health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and most health care providers.21 In 2003, HHS also published a
15. Arden B. Levy et al., Data Breaches in Health Care: New or Heightened Risks, Emerging Insurance and Legal Considerations, ABA SECT. OF LITIG. 2–4 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2014_inscle_materials/written_materials/b10_1_data_breaches_in_health_care.authcheckdam.pdf,
16. Id. at 7.
17. Deborah Buckman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. FED. 133
(2004).
18. Id.
19. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HIPAA FOR PROFESSIONALS,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/index.html (last visited Nov.29, 2017).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Security Rule that required the use of appropriate administrative and technical
safeguards to ensure the security of electronic PHI.22 The Department of Health
and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) enforces HIPAA through a
complaint and investigation process, statutorily mandated audits, fines, and penalties.23
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(“HITECH”) was passed as a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (“ARRA”).24 HITECH strengthened HIPAA Privacy and Security
Rules by adding a breach notification requirement and enhancing penalties for
violations.25 The HITECH Act also “granted State attorney generals the authority
to enforce HIPAA rules by bringing civil actions on behalf of state residents in
federal district court.”26
Important modifications to both HITECH and HIPAA were made with the
effectuation of HHS’s Omnibus Rule on March 26, 2013.27 The Omnibus Rule
made a number of changes that broadened liability of health organizations, increased penalties for violations, and changed the standards for what constitutes
a breach.28 The new rule changed the scope of liability to make not only health
care providers directly liable to HIPAA Privacy and Security requirements, but
to make their business associates directly liable, as well.29 Business associates
are defined in the Omnibus Rule as a “person who ‘creates, receives, maintains,
or transmits’ protected health information on behalf of a covered entity.”30 The
rule introduced circumstances under which covered entities may be liable for a
HIPAA violation based on the conduct of their business associates.31 The federal
common law of agency is used to determine culpability and turns on the right or

22. Id.
23. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HOW OCR ENFORCES THE HIPAA PRIVACY &
SECURITY RULES, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/howOCR-enforces-the-HIPAA-privacy-and-security-rules/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
24. See Gallee, supra note 9, at 16.
25. Id. at 17.
26. HIPAA
FINAL
RULE:
ENFORCEMENT
BY
STATE
ATTORNEYS
GENERAL,
http://www.hipaa.com/hipaa-final-rule-enforcement-by-state-attorneys-general/ (last visited Nov. 29,
2017) [hereinafter HIPAA FINALRULE].
27. Jerold Oshinsky et al., Does Your Insurance Policy Protect Against Liability Under the New
HIPAA Regulations?, URMIA J. 69, 69 (2013), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/URMIA/afec0d8f-84a3-4a20-a673b744a68477fd/UploadedFiles/URMIAJournal2013_WEB.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 70.
30. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5572 (Jan. 25, 2013)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
31. 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5581 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
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authority of the health provider to control the business associate’s conduct in the
course of performing a service on its behalf.32
Another important aspect of the 2013 Omnibus Rule was its amendment to
the Breach Notification Rule for Unsecured Protected Health Information set under HITECH.33 HITECH defined a breach as the “unauthorized acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected health information which compromises the
security or privacy of such information.”34 The rule required a finding that “compromise[ed]” data posed a “significant risk of financial, reputational, or other
harm to the individual.”35 If this harm standard was met, health care providers
were required to notify patients of the breach.36
The Omnibus Rule eliminated the “significant risk of harm” standard and
moved toward a more stringent presumption of harm standard.37 The new regulations presume a breach whenever PHI is acquired, accessed, used or disclosed
in a way that violates the Privacy Rule.38 The breach must be reported unless the
covered entity demonstrates that there is a “low probability the protected health
information has been compromised.”39 The risk assessment focuses on four factors: 1) the nature and extent of the PHI involved; 2) the unauthorized person
who used the PHI or to whom the disclosure was made; 3) whether the PHI was
actually acquired or viewed; and 4) the extent to which the risk to PHI has been
mitigated.40 In bringing about this change, HHS explained, in the preface to the
Omnibus Rule, that the previous harm standard was too subjective and set too
high a bar for triggering breach notification.41
The Omnibus Rule significantly increased the risk and scope of culpability
on the part of health care providers for breach notification and for the actions of
their business associates. In addition to this heavy burden, the rule also increased
the amount of civil penalties for HIPAA violations, which start at $100 per violation and increase up to $50,000 per violation, with a yearly maximum of $1.5
million, depending on the nature of the violation.42 There are four categories of
violations reflecting increasing levels of culpability and the corresponding penalty amounts for each.43 The baseline for a violation is establishing the covered
entity did not know or have reason to know of the violation, despite exercising
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5369.
Id.
Id. at 5638.
Oshinsky, supra note 27, at 69–70.
Id.
See supra note 30, at 5641.
78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5642 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
Id. at 5641.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a) (2013).
78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5583 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
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reasonable diligence.44 The highest culpability for a violation is established when
it is shown the violation was due to willful neglect and not timely corrected.45
B. Cost Breakdown
Calculating the cost of a data breach is not a straightforward process. The
financial repercussions are just coming to light in the industry, and it might take
years to assess the full impact of any given incident.46 Financial penalties are
being issued with increasing frequency to health care organizations for HIPAA
violations and reports of breaches continue to rise.47 The value of PHI on the
black market and the inability of customers to change information, like social
security numbers and street addresses once stolen, makes curing a breach that
much harder to resolve.48 Researchers have calculated the average cost of a
breach in 2015 at $363 per medical record.49 Breaches in health care are the most
expensive to remediate and are only growing more costly.50 In the U.S.
healthcare industry, the average cost of a breach is $398 per medical record.51
This sum is far higher than the average cost of a data breach across most other
industries at $154 per record.52 Moreover, data breaches cost the healthcare system an estimated $6 billion annually.53 Many costs are hard to predict and are
dependent on the size of the breach; however, it is extremely important to calculate potential loss in order to assess the type of coverage needed.54
According to the HIPAA Journal, there are a variety of different sources of
costs that organizations should be aware of when calculating the financial impact
of a data breach.55 First is the cost of a breach investigations, in which an external
organization must investigate to identify the the cause and source of the breach.56
44. Id. at 5582–83.
45. Id. at 5583.
46. Calculating the Cost of a HIPAA Data Breach, HIPAA J. (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.hipaajournal.com/calculating-the-cost-of-a-hipaa-data-breach-6534/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Calculating the Cost].
47. Id.
48. Tod Ferran, The Cost of HIPAA Breach Insurance, SECURITY METRICS BLOG (June 15, 2015),
http://blog.securitymetrics.com/2015/06/the-cost-of-hipaa-breach-insurance.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2017).
49. Joseph Conn, Healthcare Data Breaches Are Costliest: Study, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 28,
2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150528/NEWS/150529899.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. PONEMON INST., CRIMINAL ATTACKS ARE NOW LEADING CAUSE OF DATA BREACH IN
HEALTHCARE, ACCORDING TO NEW PONEMON STUDY (May 7, 2015), https://www.ponemon.org/news2/66.
54. Ferran, supra note 48 (advising that cyber security insurance is important for healthcare providers
as the devastating effects of a breach can result in an unspecified amount of financial damage).
55. Calculating the Cost, supra note 46.
56. Id.

276

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 19:270

In the case of a breach, the OCR oversees the organization’s spending of remediation costs, which go into implementing the safeguards that should have been
in place initially to prevent the breach.57 Temporary operational changes after a
breach require spending on issuing notifications, answering customer questions,
updating social media sites, and implementing new safeguards.58 Breach notification requirements mandate that letters must be issued to all affected individuals
by first class mail at a current cost of forty-nine cents per letter.59 The HIPAA
Journal estimates that one letter issued to all individuals affected by the breach
could cost Anthem $40 million in postage costs alone.60
The HHS included in the Omnibus Rule a summary of annual breach notification compliance costs in 2011 indicating it totaled $14,475,600.61 These costs
include: E-mail and first class mail ($3,467,122); Substitute Notices: Media Notice ($571,200); Substitute Notices: Toll-Free Number ($1,816,379); Imputed
Cost to Affected Individuals Who Call the Toll-Free Line ($2,042,665); Notice
to Media of Breach: Over 500 People ($15,420); Report to HHS: 500 or More
($15,420); Investigation Costs: Under 500 ($5,277,456); Investigation Costs:
500 or More ($837,500); and Annual Report to the Secretary ($422,438).62 Consequently, the larger the number of individuals affected from a breach, the higher
these breach notification costs will be.
HIPAA requires that entities provide free identity theft and credit monitoring services to all individuals affected for one to two years after the breach.63
This is estimated to cost $10 per individual, per month.64 As previously discussed, regulatory fines issued by the OCR are another source of expenses that
can cost as much as $1.5 million per year, per violation.65 According to the HHS
website, the highest fine ever issued was in 2014 to New York Presbyterian Hospital/Columbia University Medical Center for $4.8 million in violations.66 The
electronic PHI of 6,800 patients was impermissibly disclosed to Google.67 An
alternate source of regulatory fines can come from Attorney Generals, who have
the authority to assist the OCR in enforcing HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.68
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 30, at 5671.
Id. at 5670–75.
Calculating the Cost, supra note 46.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DATA BREACH RESULTS IN $4.8 MILLION HIPAA
SETTLEMENTS (May 7, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/jointbreachagreement.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
67. Lauren Friedman, Hospital to Pay Millions After Embarrassing Data Breach Put Patient Info on
Google, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2014).
68. HIPAA FINAL RULE, supra note 26.
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HITECH authorizes State Attorney Generals to impose fines up to $25,000 per
violation category, per year.69 Another cost that may often be unforeseeable to
an organization is the loss of business or reputation.70 A Ponemon study found
that the healthcare industry has one of the highest customer churn rates (measure
of patients who discontinue service) at six percent, which suggests that the
healthcare industry could reduce data breach costs by putting more emphasis on
customer retention.71
Finally, class-action lawsuits can be a huge source of loss for providers in
the wake of a breach.72 Three lawsuits were filed against Anthem less then
twenty-four hours after the breach announcement.73 Shortly after, a woman
claiming $5,000,000 in damages filed a class action suit against Anthem.74
Health care data breach lawsuits typically claim damages of $1,000 per victim.75
However, as in Anthem’s case, these estimates could greatly exceed that amount
in cases where a large number of patients have been harmed. These exorbitant
costs will only continue to rise in the wake of enhanced federal enforcement,
increased fines and penalties, broader liability, and larger scale data breaches that
affect millions of patients. It is increasingly important for health care entities to
have appropriate insurance coverage to help mitigate the potentially devastating
impact of a data breach.
Data breaches are unquestionably expensive and one would think that the
cost alone would incentivize companies to improve practices and safeguard patient data. The Anthem data breach is estimated to cost well over $100 million.76
To any small business, those costs would be devastating. However, to the multibillion dollar company, the cost of $100 million (much of which would be offset
by insurance) is a mere .01% of its annual revenue.77 To large corporations like
Anthem, the cost and effort to improve security defenses is simply not worth it.78
This point is important to factor in when considering remedies that not only take
on economic risk but also incentivize companies to invest in security solutions
across the board.
69. Id.
70. Calculating the Cost, supra note 46.
71. PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL ANALYSIS 16 (2015).
72. Calculating the Cost, supra note 46.
73. Mary A. Chaput, Calculating the Colossal Cost of a Data Breach, CFO (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://ww2.cfo.com/data-security/2015/03/calculating-colossal-cost-data-breach/.
74. Mike Gauntner, Warren Woman Files $5,000,000 Suit over Anthem Data Breach, WFMJ (Apr.
5, 2015), http://www.wfmj.com/story/28725895/warren-woman-files-5000000-suit-over-anthem-databreach.
75. Chaput, supra note 73.
76. Taylor Armerding, Breach Costs: ‘Chump Change’ to Bottom Lines of Big Players, CSO (June
8, 2015), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2932324/data-breach/breach-costs-chump-change-to-bottomlines-of-big-players.html.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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III. INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR DATA BREACHES
A. Traditional Insurance Coverage
Insurance manages risk and provides financial compensation in the event
of a loss. Understanding the financial impact of a data breach allows an organization to choose coverage that will most effectively mitigate these losses and
risks. A Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) policy is the traditional insurance policy issued to business organizations to protect against liability for claims
of bodily injury, property damage, and advertising and personal injury liability.79
This is the most common type of insurance policy and is the first place policyholders look when determining coverage.80 Data breach coverage disputes focus
on Coverage A: Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability and Coverage B:
Personal and Advertising Injury Liability offered under a CGL policy.81 The debate stems from whether there is “property damage” or “personal injury” in data
breach cases.82
The term “property damage” under Coverage A most often requires physical damage to “tangible property” and specifically excludes coverage for software, data, or information stored in an electronic format.83 More often than not,
courts will decline to extend coverage of “tangible property” to electronic data,
unless there is physical damage or loss of use of a tangible product, like a computer.84
Under Coverage B, “personal injury” is defined to include “oral or written
publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.”85 CGL coverage for data breaches under “personal injury” largely centers
on if there has been a “publication” of the compromised information that would
warrant coverage.86 Courts have struggled with the definition of “publication”
over the years and have made contradictory rulings about whether CGL policies

79. Commercial General Liability (CGL) Policy, IRMI, http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/c/commercial-general-liability-cgl-policy.aspx.
80. Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Evolving Exposure, Today’s Litigation, and Tomorrow’s Challenges, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 369, 382 (2015).
81. Alex E. Pontente et al., DRI’s Data Breach and Privacy Law Seminar, Insurance Coverage Issues
Implicated in Data Breach Claims, SEDGWICK LLP 403, 406 (Sept. 12, 2014).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 613 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding property
damage to a computer when it froze and became inoperable); see also American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., No. 99-185 TUC ACM, 2000 WL 726789, *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18,
2000) (holding a computer system did not suffer “physical damage” as a result of a power outage).
85. Pontente et al., supra note 81, at 406–07.
86. Podolak, supra note 80, at 383.
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extend coverage to data breaches on this basis.87 Zurich American Insurance v.
Sony Corp. of America88 was a 2014 data breach case in which the Court found
that there was no coverage available to Sony under its CGL policy.89 The hack
stole the personal information of tens of millions of Sony PlayStation users and
Sony sought coverage under the “personal injury” component of its CGL policy,
arguing that the breach constituted a “publication” of private information.90 The
Court found that a CGL policy requires the policyholder to actually commit the
act, and since hackers, and not Sony, perpetrated the “publication” of information
here, it therefore did not qualify for coverage.91 Since Zurich, the general consensus seems to be that CGL policies provide little to no coverage for liabilities
resulting from data breaches.92
Recognizing the confusion in courts over CGL coverage and the increasing
risks of data breaches, Insurance Services Office Inc. (“ISO”), which develops
standard insurance contract language, released an exclusion expressly limiting
Coverage A and B to exclude coverage “for injury or damage arising out of any
access to or disclosure of any person’s or organization’s confidential or personal
information, including patents, trade secrets, processing methods, customer lists,
financial information, credit card information, health information or any other
type of nonpublic information.”93 Moreover, “the exclusion will apply even if
damages are claimed for notification costs, credit monitor expenses . . . or any
other loss . . . incurred . . . with respect to that which is subject to the exclusion.”94 Provisions such as these, as well as the general inapplicability of traditional CGL coverage to data breaches, has demonstrated a need to transfer risk
from traditional lines to a more specific product tailored to cyber policies.

87. Jana Landon, Where Does Sony Settlement Leave CGL Insurance for Data Breaches?, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER
(May
13,
2015),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202726345560/?slreturn=20171029121429; see Butts v. Royal Vendors, 202 W.Va. 448
(1998) (holding there is no coverage for “publication of material” that violates a third party’s right to
privacy); see also Recall Total Info Mgmt. v. Federal Ins., 83 A.2d 667 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (holding
theft of information alone is insufficient to find a “publication” under a CGL policy); Hartford Cas. Ins.
v. Corcino & Assocs., No. CV 13-3728 GAF (JCx) (Oct. 7, 2013) (holding the CGL policy covered a
hospital data breach despite insurance policy exclusion for personal and advertising injury).
88. Zurich American Ins. v. Sony Corp. of America, No. 651982/2011, 2014 WL 3253541 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2014) (No. 525).
89. Id.
90. Landon, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. Jes Alexander, Anatomy of a Data Breach: What Cyber Policies Should Cover, 13 J. TEX. INS. L.
5 (2015).
93. Tatiana Melnik, Cyberliability Insurance: To Buy or Not to Buy?, 17 J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE 51, 52–53 (2015).
94. Id. at 53.
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B. Cyber Insurance
As insurers and courts are increasingly reluctant to extend CGL coverage
to data breaches, it should come as no surprise that standalone cyber security
policies are on the rise.95 As more high-profile cyber attacks happen, health organizations are increasing their investment in cyber insurance to help mitigate
their risk exposure in the case of a breach.96 Healthcare entities increased their
cyber spending to forty-one percent in 2015.97 An estimated $2 billion worth of
health-related cyber insurance was sold in 2014, and the market is growing at
twenty to twenty-five percent per year.98
A robust cybersecurity insurance market would help reduce cyber attacks
by promoting the adoption of better security practices in exchange for more coverage and lower rates.99 Policyholders could devote more resources to their cybersecurity infrastructure and actively work to improve the quality of data collection and monitor cyber threats.100 Insurers could offer reduced premiums to
those seeking coverage if they take steps to decrease the extent of the insurer’s
liability, which would increase competition and lower market prices.101 This
could shift the focus of health care organizations to the value of security implemented, rather than simply complying with baseline protocols. A healthy, competitive cyber insurance market could provide a fluid system to minimize damage
and recovery time in the aftermath of a data breach.
However, despite increasing demand for cyber insurance, this ideal model
of a competitive, affordable market has yet to be achieved. A standardized assessment of cyber risk does not yet exist.102 The relatively new market for cyber
insurance creates a difficult risk to price by traditional insurance methods since
there is a lack of actuarial data available.103 The unpredictable probability and
nature of data breaches, paired with the unknown impact of long-term financial

95. Garrie & Mann, supra note 12, at 384.
96. Patricia Harman, Cyber Attacks Drive Insurance Purchases in Early 2015,
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99. Laura A. Odell, Cyber Insurance – Managing Cyber Risk, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSIS 1, 4 (Apr.
2015).
100. Id.
101. Liam M.D. Bailey, Mitigating Moral Hazard in Cyber-Risk Insurance, 3 J.L. CYBER WARFARE
1, 18–19 (2014).
102. Id. at 8–9 (stating a comprehensive cyber security system is difficult to create as each industry
that requires cyber security development has a markets with different needs).
103. Leigh Thomas & Jim Finkle, Insurers Struggle to Get Grip on Burgeoning Cyber Risk Market,
REUTERS (July 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/14/us-insurance-cybersecurityidUSKBN0FJ0B820140714?feedType=RSS&feedName=businessNews.
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loss, makes it extremely hard for insurers to adequately assess actual risks for a
given company and leaves them unprepared for a catastrophic cyber event.104
Typically, insurance companies purchase reinsurance from other insurance companies to spread risk and limit the total loss the original insurer would experience
in the event of a disaster.105
The rise of data breaches has prompted insurers to significantly increase
cyber premiums and deductibles while capping coverage at $100 million.106
Some estimates conclude that a company may need as much as $1 billion in cyber
insurance to protect its assets, but most companies will be unable to secure more
than $300 million.107 Health insurance companies that have experienced a data
breach seem to be hit the hardest, with some premiums tripling on renewal.108
Anthem ran into difficulties renewing its coverage in the aftermath of the data
breach, managing to get $100 million in coverage, but only with a $25 million
deductible.109 High-profile data hacks are finally giving insurers a little insight
into the financial impact of a breach, and the results are devastating.110 The high
cost of cyber security insurance may put health care companies in the position of
choosing between spending money on cyber insurance or investing those funds
into better cyber security infrastructure.111
IV. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK IS FAILING
The rise of data breaches exposed the failure of existing safeguards and
mechanisms to not only protect against these risks, but to prevent them from
reoccurring in the future. Cyber insurance coverage will not, in itself, fully mitigate the risk posed by data breaches. As previously mentioned, for large companies like Anthem, the cost of a data breach amounted to a mere .01% of its annual
revenue.112 Most corporations in this position would rather write off the losses
than spend two to three times that on heightened security measures.113 From a

104. Odell, supra note 99, at 3.
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visited Nov. 29, 2017).
108. Goldman, supra note 14.
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110. See id. (noting the cyber security attacks resulted in enormous costs to healthcare companies and
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purely financial perspective, the possibility of a massive data breach is quite rare,
so improving data security practices seems like a waste of money.114
There is little to no incentive for health care organizations to invest in digital security as a proactive approach to preventing data breaches.115 Cyber insurance coverage is a reactive protection measure that bears part of the risk, but does
nothing to motivate health entities to reduce the risk firsthand.116 This is a classic
moral hazard problem, meaning that when financially protected through insurance, an individual’s motives and behavior to prevent loss are reduced, resulting
in an increased probability of loss.117 Risk transfer can either lead to more risky
behaviors, or incentivize positive behaviors through the implementation of prevention measures.118 Thus, any realistic remedy to the data breach problem must
reallocate economic risk to kick-start the cyber insurance market and incentivize
cyber insurers to effectuate security measures to reduce overall risk.
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Federal Government Reinsurance Program
The federal government as reinsurer could help stimulate and prioritize the
cyber insurance market. The infancy of the market for cyber insurance impedes
its growth as an industry due to a scarcity of data and a high level of uncertainty
that causes insurers to raise premiums and lower coverage.119 Coverage limits
should encompass a majority of a policyholder’s loss; however, uncertainty as to
the full extent of loss means there are many indirect effects from cyber losses
that cannot be measured and thus not covered.120
A transitional federal reinsurance program could subsidize insurance costs
and help the market remain afloat until cyber reinsurers can get a better sense of
data and risk for more affordable premiums.121 This could increase the supply of
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2015),
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cyber insurance, reduce prices, and increase competition in the market.122 Guaranteed reinsurance for a breach from the federal government could make insurers
feel more secure in offering large amounts of cyber insurance coverage to those
companies that need it.123 Ultimately, insurance companies need to know more
about the likelihood of a breach, how breaches should be valued, and how to
measure the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk management strategies designed
to address them.124 A reinsurance program could promote the security insurance
companies’ need to join and compete in the market and create time in which
relevant actuarial data can be developed until enough information exists for the
market to be able to fully stand on its own.125
The federal government acting as a reinsurer of last resort in the event of
catastrophic loss is not a new concept.126 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002 (“TRIA”), administered by the U.S. Department of Treasury, created a temporary federal reinsurance program that, in the event of a major terrorist attack,
allows the insurance industry and federal government to share losses.127 TRIA
offers a measure of certainty to the insurance industry as to the maximum size of
losses insurers would have to pay and is triggered when losses exceed a certain
amount.128 The law has had positive effects on the insurance market, with
roughly sixty percent of commercial policyholders purchasing coverage over the
past few years and generally pushing prices for terrorism insurance downward.129
However, it is important to note that TRIA was meant to be a “temporary”
subsidy program while the financial services industry developed the “systems,
mechanisms, products, and programs necessary to create a viable . . . market for
private terrorism risk insurance.”130 The Act was originally set to expire in 2005,
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CONG. RES. SERV. (Jul. 23, 2014).
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but has been renewed three times since, most recently in January 2015 for another six years after Congress allowed it to expire on December 31, 2014.131
Critics of the Act point out the program’s shifting of the potential costs of terrorist losses from businesses to taxpayers.132 Others argue that continued federal
involvement in terrorism insurance is hindering the private insurance market
from developing capabilities to be able to handle this risk on its own.133 The
Department of Treasury cautioned the public about renewing the program, “noting that it was meant to be temporary, and urging more reliance on the private
sector.”134
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), while not a federal reinsurance program, provides an example of federal government intervention aimed
at filling a gap in the insurance market.135 In 1968, Congress created the NFIP to
help provide flood insurance to property owners.136 The catastrophic effects of
floods were causing enormous losses to life and property, and the only financial
recourse available to victims was in disaster assistance.137 Private insurance companies could not provide flood insurance coverage at an affordable price due its
devastating nature and the lack of an actuarial rate structure to reflect the risk.138
The NFIP, administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”), is a voluntary program through which participating communities
agree to adopt and enforce regulation of floodplain development to reduce future
flood damages.139 In return, property owners within a participating community
may elect to purchase federally backed flood insurance.140 FEMA works closely
with more than eighty private insurance companies to offer flood insurance to
these communities at nationally established (below-market) rates.141 The revenue
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collected from the purchased policies help to pay for claims, but when claims
exceed revenues, the NFIP is authorized to borrow from the U.S. Treasury.142
While the NFIP has undoubtedly reduced claims from flood risk and future
damages by increasing preparedness standards and flood insurance adoption, financial concerns led the U.S. General Accounting Office to determine that the
program is not actuarially sound.143 This suggests that premiums collected for
policies are insufficient to serve as a reserve for paying out potential catastrophic
losses.144 The subsidized premiums offered under the NFIP do not actually reflect the risk associated with properties, and they resulted in net annual losses as
high as $600 million.145 NFIP borrowed billions of dollars from the Treasury
Department to cover claims from devastating natural disasters, like Hurricane
Katrina, and by 2014, the continued borrowing caused the program to incur a
total of $23 billion in debt.146 One of the possible solutions proposed to remedy
this debt is to keep the federal government as the primary line of flood insurance,
but to pay a reinsurance premium to the private sector to take on losses exceeding
a loss amount or based on particular flood disaster size.147
The final and most recent precedent for federal government reinsurance can
be found in the 2010 Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).148 The ACA is a comprehensive health reform law aimed at providing more affordable healthcare, expanding coverage, and improving the health care delivery system.149 The law
requires most U.S. citizens to enroll in health insurance plans and requires states
to establish health insurance exchanges, through which private insurers sell
plans, in compliance with ACA regulations.150 Enrollees whose household income falls between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty level can receive federal premium subsidies on plans purchased through these state exchanges.151
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The ACA brought a big change to how insurers offered plans in that it prohibits insurers from denying coverage to people, excluding pre-existing conditions or varying premiums based on health status.152 Not knowing how many
people will enroll, or the proportion of sick beneficiaries, creates more uncertainty and larger risk for insurance providers in this new market.153 To improve
incentives for insurers to participate and limit the amount an insurance company
can lose in the marketplace, the ACA created three risk-sharing programs: a permanent risk adjustment program, a temporary risk-corridor program, and a transitional reinsurance program.154
The permanent risk adjustment program aims to reduce incentives for
health insurance plans to enroll people with higher than average costs. This is
achieved by having plans with lower than average actuarial risk make payments
to those plans whose individuals have higher than average risk.155 The HHS or
state exchanges assess the actuarial risk of the insurance pool within each plan
and compare it to the average of all the plans in the state in order to shift the
money accordingly.156
The temporary risk corridors program mitigates pricing uncertainty (of who
will enroll and what their health spending will be) by sharing gains and losses
between plans and the federal government.157 Actual claims are compared to expected claims assumed in the insurer’s premiums.158 If actual claims exceed or
fall below expected claims by more or less than three percent, HHS will either
reimburse the plan for at least fifty percent of excess loss, or the plan will pay
HHS at least fifty percent of the excess gained.159
The risk corridor program was not originally required to be budget neutral;
however, the 2015 Cromnibus Bill mandated that “2014 risk corridors receivables paid in 2015 be funded through payables into the program from other insurers.”160 This legislation came after 2014 insurance premiums had already been
set and when most insurers “anticipated receiving full payment for the money
the government owed under the risk corridors program.”161 The result is a “$2.5
billion shortfall between the money taken in under the program and the money
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owed to those who lost money.”162 Insurers would receive only 12.5% of what
they thought they would receive in 2014.163
The transitional reinsurance plan helps stabilize premiums in early years
and reduces incentives for insurers to avoid high-cost individuals by providing
reinsurance payments to individuals whose medical costs reach a threshold cost,
which was $70,000 in 2015.164 Reinsurance payments stop when the individual’s
costs reach $250,000.165 The federal government will reimburse the plan for at
least fifty percent of the claims cost between the threshold cost and cap in
2015.166 Funding for the reinsurance program comes from fees levied on all
health insurance plans, and HHS can adjust payments to ensure that payments do
not exceed contributions collected.167 Contributions and reimbursements from
the program will decline until the program expires and allows insurers to price
their premiums ten to fifteen percent lower in the new marketplace.168
What the cyber security insurance market needs to function in the market
and what government-sponsored reinsurance offers are one and the same: lower
premiums and reduction of risk.169 The need for a temporary reinsurance program will reduce once insurers gain sufficient experience in the market.170 Reinsurance, as best exemplified through ACA and TRIA, is a risk-shifting mechanism that reallocates risks away from the most vulnerable parties.171 This type of
risk management will facilitate the widespread availability and affordability of
cyber insurance coverage in the marketplace.
Modeling cyber reinsurance after the TRIA could ensure that the government does not completely take over the risk, as insurers are still responsible for
modest deductibles.172 Also, the temporary nature of the TRIA could stimulate
market solutions as opposed to the more permanent NFIP model in which the
government, acting as primary insurer, sets its own premiums unrelated to risk
and leaves no room for the market to develop on its own.173 A transitional government reinsurance program would have to differ from the TRIA; however, in
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that it needs to truly be temporary and not constantly renewed.174 Because the
TRIA model does not charge premiums to be eligible, the costs are borne by the
taxpayers subject to recoupment.175 This is often a criticism of the continuing
nature of the program, as it only extends the burden on the public taxpayers.176
The danger of having the federal government charge premiums for reinsurance is that the risk of cyber insurance is still not known, and providing low
premiums that do not correctly reflect the risk will leave the program in massive
debt.177 It would be wise to stick with the TRIA model of not charging premiums,
since even on occasions that a premium is charged for government intervention,
the premium does not actually reflect the risk.178 The ACA does not charge premiums for its reinsurance, but requires health insurance upon which it charges
fees to help reinsure the risk and lower premium prices in the new market.179
Requiring mandatory cyber insurance on organizations is too drastic a solution
and an extremely complicated undertaking that may not be the fairest solution.180
While the TRIA model promotes cyber insurance coverage by shifting unpredictable and catastrophic economic risks to the government, a preventive riskreducing model must also be incorporated to avert the likelihood and magnitude
of said risks in the future. The National Flood Insurance Program most closely
resembles a risk prevention framework. In order to qualify for flood insurance, a
community must adopt floodplain management regulations and ordinances to reduce the risk and consequences of serious flooding.181 “Flood damage is decreased by almost $1 billion a year through community enforcement of floodplain management” requirements and buildings “constructed in agreement with
NFIP building standards experience about 80% less damage.”182 The NFIP must
be distinguished in that the federal government acts as a primary insurer rather
than reinsurer.183 In the field of cyber security, the objective is not to completely
eradicate the private insurance market, but to help stabilize it until it can function
on its own. The preventative idea of the NFIP, however, could be incorporated
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within a reinsurance framework to help cure the incentive problem in the
healthcare industry.
The ideal federal program would act both as a risk shifter and risk reducer.184 Federal reinsurance for a data breach would be triggered by a threshold
amount of loss. Since most insurance coverage for cyber security currently caps
at $100 to 300 million, the baseline for qualifying for federal funds should start
at least around this number. The insurance industry will still be responsible for
paying for a certain amount of the losses through deductibles (the amount an
insurer must pay before the federal program kicks in) and copayments (the
amount insurers must pay above their individual deductibles).185 It is hard to say
how long this program will be needed, but if the law must be renewed, the threshold amount of loss should become higher each time, along with the percentage
of deductibles and copayments for which the insurer is responsible.186
However, unlike TRIA, this federal reinsurance would not kick in for any
data breach that exceeds a certain amount. The insurer must be eligible for federal reinsurance to qualify. The federal government could incentivize insurers to
require policyholders to comply with minimum security standards as a condition
of coverage, or adoption of a framework formulated by the government. On the
condition that insurers promote these preventative measures to their policyholders, they would be eligible for federal reinsurance in the event of a massive data
breach. This would avoid a moral hazard problem and instead, promote risk
transfer as a means of positively influencing risk-reduction behavior.187
B.

Increased Regulation and Guidance

The federal government classifies the strengthening of cyber security and
data as “one of the most important challenges we face as a Nation.”188 One of the
biggest impediments to the maturation of the cyber insurance market is the scarcity of data and unknown certainty of the risk.189 Information sharing about cyber
risks and the magnitude and loss impact of actual data breaches would help accelerate the growth of the insurance market.190 The issue with information shar-
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ing is that private organizations are concerned that “voluntarily sharing information [with the government] will expose them to significant sources of potential
liability.”191
The rise of data breaches and cyber hacks has put pressure on lawmakers
to address information security.192 In October 2015, the Senate passed the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (“CISA”) to give companies legal immunity
for sharing private data with the federal government.193 If a company gets hit
with a specific type of hack, the federal government would receive an alert and
immediately warn other companies and help strengthen cyber defenses.194 Critics
are concerned with provisions in the bill that allow the Department of Homeland
Security to share information gathered with other government agencies, seemingly endorsing a surveillance agenda that benefits the intelligence community.195 CISA includes privacy guards to ensure companies wipe customer specific data before handing information to the government, but there are still
worries that companies, in a hurry, might not remove all patient specific data
before sharing information with the government.196
The bill still needs to be reconciled with two information-sharing bills
passed in the House, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (“PCNA”) and the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act (“NCPAA”), before it becomes law.197 The need for government direction on information sharing is crucial to heightening security defenses.198 The difficulty will be in how to
accomplish security without infringing on privacy interests.199 To truly promote
security, any legislation aimed at information sharing must be narrowly tailored
to include only that information needed for securing systems, be solely used for
that purpose, and clean of any identifying personal information.200
In addition to information sharing, there is a need for increased guidance
for development of a cyber security infrastructure. The healthcare industry needs
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better guidance for use and protection of health data.201 The federal government
should be involved in defining metrics and setting data security requirements, or
at least minimum standards, insurers can use to qualify companies for cyber insurance policies.202 Information sharing would only help the government better
define industry standards and best practices to help organizations manage cyber
security risk.203
In 2013, the President issued Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which directed the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (“NIST”) to develop a framework for reducing cyber risks to
critical infrastructure.204 The result was a general framework aimed at helping
organizations evaluate their current cyber security systems in order to meet certain goals and achieve a higher level of efficiency.205 This framework is purely
voluntary and broadly applicable to any industry, but it is a good start.206
There is potential for insurance companies to use something like the NIST
framework to evaluate risk in cyber insurance policies.207 It has been suggested
that insurers score policyholders based on the safeguards or objectives outlined
in the framework.208 Based on the score given to company, the insurer could set
a premium, how high the deductible should be, and how much coverage to extend.209 This type of guidance could be useful in the federal government’s role
as a risk reducer, and could help create a set of standards for insurers to abide by
in order to be eligible for federal reinsurance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ongoing rise of data breaches exposed the failure of our current system
to address this problem. The newly emerging cyber insurance market is not mature enough to singlehandedly manage the risks posed by data breaches. Even if
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the market were capable of handling these risks, the risk-spreading nature of insurance would not provide the incentives needed to reduce the nature of risk and
mitigate its damages for the future. The federal government must take on a temporary role as both risk shifter and risk reducer if it hopes to provide a meaningful, long-lasting solution to this problem. Information sharing and regulatory
guidelines can help accelerate the development of the market and set uniform
standards from which insurers can demand compliance from policyholders. The
very role of insurance must be refocused and only the federal government can
help repurpose the insurance sector to provide a system-wide solution to data
breach risk.

